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What is precisely meant by the term "act of God" has un-
dergone much discussion and the expression has received a
variety of definitions. But a study of the history of the term's
use reveals that the definitions differ rather in mode of ex-
pression than in the substance of their signification. The earli-
est use of the expression to be found in the law books is by
Sir Edward Coke in 1581 in Shelley's Case where the term
was employed in speaking of the death of a man.' Coke used
this expression frequently in later cases applying it to a sud-
den tempest breaking down sea-walls. In applying the phrase
"act of God", Coke used it as equivalent to an accident which
is "so inevitable that, by no providence or industry of him
who is bound, it can be prevented", or as in Shelley's Case,
supra, "which no industry could avoid or policy prevent". The
phrase "act of God" was used by other judges during this
time2 but they did not define its meaning and the cases did
not require it. 3 In 1785 Lord Mansfield introduced the idea
which has been at the basis of the modern narrow conception
of the term, namely, that it is such an act that could not hap-
pen by the intervention of man, as storms, lightning and
tempest.4 The South Carolina court has defined act of God as
an accident resulting from natural causes, impossible to be
foreseen, and therefore impossible to be guarded against.
Other courts have defined an act of God as something super-
human, in contradiction to the act of men.6 Perhaps the most
comprehensive definition of the term is "any accident, due
directly and exclusively to natural causes without human in-
1. Coke 93b, 97b, 76 Reprint 206 (1581).
2. Coggs v. Bernard, 2 Ld. Raym. 909, 92 Reprint 107, 5 E. R. C. 247
(1704).
3. For a comprehensive history of its early use see Hays v. Ken-
nedy, 41 Pa. 378, 80 Am. Dec. 627 (1861).
4. Forward v. Pittard, 1 T. R. 27, 99 ENG. REPORTS 953 (1785).
5. Ewart v. Street, 2 Bailey 157 (S. C. 1831) ; of. Henry Sonneborn
& Co. v. Southern Ry. Co., 65 S. C. 502, 44 S. E. 77 (1903).
6. Kirby v. Wylie, 108 Md. 501, 70 A. 213, 21 L. R. A. (N. S.) 129
(1908).
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tervention, which by no amount of foresight, pains, or care,
reasonably to be expected, could have been prevented".
7
An analysis of definitions found in decided cases and text
material reveal that practically all agree in requiring the en-
tire exclusion of human agency from the cause of the injury
or loss.8 So it may be laid down as accepted law that no mat-
ter what degree of prudence man may exercise, even though
the delusions by which he is baffled or the force by which he
is overcome be inevitable, yet, if there be any co-operation of
man, or any admixture of human means, the injury is not,
in a legal sense, an act of God.9 Therefore if different causes
concur in the loss, the act of God being one, but not the proxi-
mate cause, man is not discharged from liability, for it is well
settled that the act of God must be the sole and proximate
cause of the injury.'0 However, in some jurisdictions, it has
been held the act of God completely exonerates man from
liability even though there may have been some negligent de-
lay prior to the happening of such act;" and, of course, if the
act of God is so overwhelming as of its own force to produce
the injury independently of the negligence shown, the negli-
gent party is not responsible.'
2
In addition to exclusion of human agency the act of God
must have been such as not to have been within the contem-
plation of the parties and which could not have been foreseen
by the exercise of reasonable foresight and prudence. Thus
the term has been defined as:
An act, event, happening or occurrence, so accidental,
extraordinary, inevitable, irresistible, providential, un-
avoidable, unprecedented or unpreventable, that human
foresight could not foresee or guard against it, and the
effect of which could not be prevented or avoided by the
7. 1 C. 3. S. 1423; Also see collected definitions BLAcK's LAW DIc-
TIONARY (4th Ed. 1951); 1 WORDS AND PHRASES 169.
8. "The' act must be one occasioned exclusively by the violence of
nature and all human agency is to be excluded from creating or enter-
ing into the causes of the mischief". Baynham v. State Highway Dept.
of S. C., 181 S. C. 435, 187 S. E. 528 (1936); cf. Gans S. S. Line v.
Wilhelmsen, 275 F. 254 (1921); Southern Ry Co. v. Cohen Weenen &
Co., 156 Va. 313, 157 S. E. 563 (1931); Alaska Coast Co. v. Alaska Barge
Co., 79 Wash. 216, 140 P. 334, L. R. A. 1915C 423 (1914) ; 1 C. J. S. 1424.
9. 9 Am. Jur. 850.
10. See annotations, 46 A. L. R. 306; Ann. Cas. 1918A 581.
11. Seaboard Air Line R. Co. v. Mullin, 70 Fla. 450, 70 So. 467, L. R.
A. 1916D 982 (1915).
12. Director General of Railroads v. Bryant's Adm'r., 127 Va. 651, 105
S. E. 389 (1920).
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ACT OF GOD
exercise of reasonable prudence, diligence, and care, or
by the use of those means which the situation renders it
reasonable to employ.' 3
In accord with this definition was the decision in the case of
Jacoby v. Gillette14 in which the Court held that a sudden dis-
charge of an unprecedented volume of flood water into an
artificial drainage ditch, resulting from a phenomenally sud-
den thaw of a heavy snowfall which created flood conditions
of unusual and catastrophic nature was an act of God.
OTHER TERMS DISTINGUISHED
Although the terms "act of God" and "inevitable accident"
are sometimes used as synonymous or equivalent terms,16 in
legal phraseology they have a distinction in meaning.16 By in-
evitable accident is meant an unforeseen and unexpected event
occurring externally to the person affected by it, and of which
his own agency is not the proximate cause; consequently, that
may be an inevitable accident which no foresight or precau-
tion on the part of the person could prevent although it had
its origin either in whole or in part in the agency of man. On
the other hand we have seen that the phrase "act of God" de-
notes a natural incident that could not happen by the inter-
vention of man, as storms, lightning, and tempest. So while
every act of God is an inevitable accident it does not follow
that every inevitable accident is an act of God. For example,
damage by lightning, an act of God, is also an inevitable ac-
cident; but authorities have held that a collision of two vessels
in the dark, an inevitable accident, is not an act of God, the
accident resulting from the agency of man and not natural
causes. 7 This distinction is important in that carriers are ex-
empt from liability at civil law for inevitable accidents while
remaining liable therefor at common law.'8
The phrase "perils of the sea", like "inevitable accident",
has been used interchangeably with the phrase "act of God" 19
13. 1 C. J. S. 1425.
14 ....... Wyo ........ 174 P. 2d 505, 177 P. 2d 204, 169 A. L. R. 502 (1946).
15. Marsh ads. Blythe's Ex'rs, 1 McCord 360 ( S. C. 1821).
16. "The failure to correctly distinguish between inevitable accident
and act of God in charging the jury was held not to require a reversal
if the jury could not have been misled thereby." Blythe v. Denver & Rio
Grande R. Co., 15 Colo. 333, 25 P. 702, 11 L. R. A. 615 (1891); note 9,
supra.
17. See annotation, 11 L. R. A. 615.
18. 9 Am. Jur. 851.
19. Williams v. Grant, 1 Conn. 487, 7 Am. Dec. 235 (1816).
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although many courts have recognized the difference in mean-
ing.20 The phrase "perils of the sea" is generally defined to
be such accidents as ordinarily result from navigation upon
that element. Early courts held that destruction of a vessel by
rats was a peril of the sea (to prevent this, shipowners
adopted the custom of keeping cats aboard) ; yet this could
hardly be deemed a loss by an act of God. It is also well
settled that a fire, not the effect of lightning, occurring at sea
is a peril of the sea; yet an accident so happening is not ac-
counted an act of God, excusing the common carrier from re-
sponsibility.21 So it may be seen that the term "perils of the
sea" has a much wider signification than the expression "act
of God".
In addition to the expressions "inevitable accident" and
"perils of the sea", the phrase "act of God" has been used in-
terchangeably with or compared or distinguished from a host
of other terms. To mention a few: actus Dei,22 unavoidable
accident,23 vis mjor2M and vis divina.25
PARTICULAR OCCURRENCES CONSIDERED
After the above abstract consideration in terms of history,
definitions, and distinction of what in law is deemed to be an
act of God, it would be well by way of practical illustration
to give a few concrete examples of what occurrences have been
held by the courts to come within the legal comprehension
of the expression.
The majority of occurrences may be classified under the
heading "forces of nature". The forces of nature most often
mentioned in cases and text are lightning, tornadoes, storms
or tempest, earthquakes, and sudden squalls of wind. South
Carolina cases accordingly hold these forces to be acts of God,
and in the case of Slater v. South Carolina Ry. Co.,26 which
20. Reaves v. Waterman, 2 Speers 197 (S. C. 1843).
21. Plaisted v. Boston & K. Steam Nay. Co., 27 Me. 132, 46 Am. Dec.
587 (1847).
22. Charleston & Columbia Steam Boat Co. ads. Bason, Harp. 262
(S. C. 1824).
23. Note 22, supra.
24. "Act of God means in law, not only a vis major, but a vis major
uncoupled with negligence." Sloan v. J. G. White Engineering Co., 105
S. C. 226, 89 S. E. 964 (1915) . . . The term "vis major" (superior
force) is used in the civil law in the same way that the words "act of
God" are used in the common law. 44 WoRDs AN PHRAsS 314.
25. Note 22, supra.
26. 29 S. C. 96, 6 S. E. 936 (1888).
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involved a suit against a common carrier for loss of property
in transportation, the court held that the injury was caused
entirely by an earthquake, there being no negligence shown
on the part of the defendant, and a nonsuit was granted. How-
ever, in the case of Sloan v. J. G. White Engineering Co.,
27
which was an action for the death of a servant struck by
lightning alleged to have come over a negligently ungrounded
wire into a power house where the servant was working, the
court recognized that "lightning does the will of God", but
held that the defendants, since they had peculiar knowledge
of the proper grounding of the wire, had the burden of prov-
ing that the lightning was a sole cause and did not concur
with their own negligence. In the same category as above
would come any unprecedented flood or freshets of unprece-
dented nature. But the flood or freshet would be held not to be
an act of God where it could have been anticipated by ordinary
foresight and prudence, or where it could have been prevented
or reduced by labor or exercise of diligence, or where the loss
was in fact due to the negligence of man. Thus, in the case
of Baynham v. State Highway Department,28 where defend-
ant in reconstructing a highway allegedly deflected flood
waters so as to inundate plaintiff's property, the court held it
was a question for the jury to determine whether the defend-
ant could and should have anticipated, by the exercise of or-
dinary foresight and prudence, such floods as did occur. Like
floods, freezing weather has sometimes been held to be an
act of God,29 but it would not be such if it came during the
season of the year when such weather is expected.30
A loss by fire, unless caused by lightning, does not come
within the exception "act of God", 31 and a defendant will be
liable for any such loss, even though the fire originated out-
side the premises controlled by him. This rule is predicated on
the theory that no matter how accidental the conflagration,
it must have originated by human means and cannot be said
to be an act of God.32 Thus, in the case of Gilmore v. Carman,33
27. 105 S. C. 226, 89 S. E. 564 (1915).
28. 181 S. C. 435, 187 S. E. 528 (1936).
29. Lamb v. W. H. Mitchell & Co., 15 Ga. App. 759, 84 S. E. 213
(1915).
30. Bernstein v. Illinois Cent. R. Co., 234 Mich. 614, 208 N. W. 679
(1926).
31. Gilmore v. Carman, 1 Smedes & M. 279, 40 Am. Dec. 96 (Miss.
1843) ; see note, 31 Am. Dec. 554.
32. Ewart v. Street, 2 Bailey 157 (S. C. 1831).
33. Note 31, supra.
425
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where plaintiff sued to recover the value of thirty-two bales
of cotton which were consumed by fire aboard the steamship
Vicksburg, the court, in holding the defendant liable, stated
that "a loss by lightning is Within the exception of an act of
God; but a loss proceeding from any other cause is charge-
able upon the ship owner". In accord with this reasoning is
the South Carolina case of Patton's Adm'rs. v. Magrath.34 In
that case, cotton was stored in a large boat alongside the
steamship Augusta. During the night, while the captain and
the crew were sleeping, the cotton, still in the boat alongside
the Augusta, was burnt. The cause of the fire was not dis-
covered. The court, in holding the shipowner liable, stated
that both the defendant and the plaintiff were, morally speak-
ing, innocent; but one of the two must bear the loss and the
law decrees it to the carriers. However, where a fire is caused
by lightning and there is no negligence after discovery of
the fire, the loss will be attributed to an act of God. And in
the case of Britton Lumber Co. v. Central of Georgia Ry.
Co.,35 a carrier had placed a carload of lumber upon a trans-
fer track to be taken by another carrier. Within two hours
after the lumber had been placed on the transfer track light-
ning struck a nearby warehouse and set fire thereto. This fire
was communicated to the carload of lumber causing its de-
struction. The court held the defendant not liable, stating that
the fire was caused by lightning, and further that the defend-
ant was not guilty of negligence after the fire was duly and
promptly discovered.
Other occurrences that have been held to be acts of God
include collisions, death or sickness, and a strike accompanied
by intimidation and violence.36 Collisions are generally not
considered to be acts of God,3 7 especially where negligence on
the part of individuals enters into the accident. The question
as to whether a collision with sunken rocks or other objects
is an act of God depends upon the nature of the accident and
the previous knowledge of the existence of such dangers.38
34. Dud. 159 (S. C. 1838)-case was remanded for further con-
sideration by the jury. For spontaneous combustion being classed as an
exception along with lightning, see Chevallier v. Straham,. 2 Tex. 115,
47 Am. Dec. 639 (1838).
35. 221 Ala. 134, 127 So. 824 (1930).
36. 1 C. J. S. 1430.
37. Alaska Coast Co. v. Alaska Barge Co., 79 Wash. 216, 140 P. 334
(1914).
38. 1 C. J. 1178.
6
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Where they are previously unknown and could not have been
avoided by ordinary care and prudence, the collision will be
considered an act of God. Such was the case of Smyrl v.
Niolon.39 Here, goods were being transported by boat from
Camden to Charleston. The goods were damaged when the
boat ran afoul of a snag in the river. At the spot the accident
occurred there was a sufficient depth of water for the pas-
sage of boats, and there was no evidence that it was out of the
accustomed channel of the river. The court held the defend-
ant not liable, ruling that frequent freshets, the continual
changes of the channel and deposits of snags thereby, arise im-
mediately from no human agency and can be guarded against
by no human skill, and hence clearly come within the excep-
tion of the act of God. But where negligence has contributed
to the injury the loss will not be considered as resulting from
an act of God. For example, the sinking of a steamboat caused
by coming in contact with a mast of a schooner which had
sunk in a squall two days before was held not to be caused
by an act of God, although the sinking of the sloop was caused
by an act of God. 40 Death or illness has been regarded as an
act of God so as to excuse non-performance of a contract;
however, the performance must be impossible and not only
difficult or undesirable. And hence the suspension of a school
by reason of an epidemic of a contagious disease does not de-
feat the right of the teacher to compensation under his con-
tract.
41
Courts have held the following not to come within the defi-
nition of "act of God": inability to finance a project,42 changes
in styles of wearing apparel,43 war,44 a landslide closing a
canal,45 and explosions.4 6 Thus, where a landslide at Culebra
Cut, in the Panama Canal, blocked traffic through the canal
for several months, the court held this not to be an act of God
since it was the result, which could have been expected, of a
39. 2 Bailey 421 (S. C. 1831).
40. Merritt v. Earle, 29 N. Y. 115 (1865).
41. Carthage School Town v. Gray, 10 Ind. A. 428, 37 N. E. 1059
(1894); 1 C. J. 1179.
42. Simms v. Folt's Mission Institute, 276 N. Y. S. 145, 154 Misc. 384
(1934).
43. Rosenblatt v. Winstanley, (Mo. App.) 186 S. W. 542 (1916).
44. Felder v. Oldham, 199 Ga. 820, 35 S. E. 2d 497, 164 A. L. R.
415 (1945).
45. Gans S. S. Line v. Wilhelmsen, 275 F. 254 (2nd Cir. 1921).
46. John Lysaght, Limited v. Lehigh Valley R. Co., 254 P. 351 (S. D.
N. Y. 1918); cf. McCall v. Brock, 5 Strob. 119 (S. C. 1850).
7
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deliberate widening of the canal, which in its entirety was a
bold and daring experiment of human activity.4 7 Likewise, it
was held, in Felder v. Oldham,48 that World War II, which
caused labor shortages and prevented a purchaser from re-
moving timber within the contract period, was not an act of
God which would authorize an extension of time for removal
of timber.
FIELDS OF LITIGATION
The term "act of God" invades numerous fields of litigation,
some of which are: Carriers, Contracts, Insurance, Sales, and
Torts. Since the elements necessary to constitute an act of God
are the same for each branch of law, this note will be confined
to the relation of act of God to Carriers, which is perhaps the
main source of litigation concerning this subject.
LIABILITY OF CARRIERS
Under early common law the only recognized exceptions to
the liability of a common carrier for the loss or injury of
property were where such loss or injury was occasioned by the
act of God or a public enemy. But to these exceptions have
since been added cases where the loss or injury is a result of
the inherent nature of the property or the act or default of the
owner or shipper himself.49 The discussion below relates only
to the exception "'act of God".
Today in a large majority of jurisdictions the liability of a
carrier of goods is placed on the same footing as was estab-
lished by the immemorial usages of the Kingdom of Great
Britain. This is also the rule in South Carolina; however, the
earliest case in this state, Eveleigh v. Sylvester, decided in
1807,50 made a distinction in favor of water carriers. In
that case a boat was snagged in the usual course of the Santee
River. Counsel for the plaintiff relied on the doctrine relative
to common carriers, i.e., that they are answerable in all events
except for an act of God or the public enemies of the country.
But the court refused to strictly apply the doctrine of the
English law in regard to common carriers, to carriers in boats
on rivers, and held that this class of carriers is not answer-
able for accidents which ordinary foresight, diligence, and
47. Note 45, supra.
48. Note 44, supra.
49. 9 Am. Jur. 847.
50. 2 Brev. 178 (S. C. 1807).
428
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skill could not have prevented. Fortunately this doctrine was
forgotten in the long sleep of thirty-two years which it enjoyed
before publication. Twelve years later, in the case of Har-
rington v. Lyles,51 Judge Johnson tells us, it was only with
difficulty that he could bring his mind to adopt the common
law rule of the liability of carriers. If he had been informed
truly of the doctrine of Eveleigh v. Sylvester, he would, with
his authority, have enforced and maintained it, but instead he
referred to Eveleighi v. Sylvester as authority for the common
law rule in its application to boatmen and decided the case
accordingly. In the case of Harrington v. Lyles, supra, the de-
fendant boatman had aboard ship cotton, which had become
wet due to incessant rains. His boat was lashed to another
during the voyage, but upon entering the canal he separated
his boat and during the night it overturned.
In the case of Charleston & Columbia Steam Boat Co. ads
Bason,5 2 an exception was introduced as additional to the act
of God or enemies of the country. In this case, a steamboat of
the defendant company, going through an inland passage, was
grounded from the reflux of the tide and fell over so that the
bilge water rose into the cabin and injured a box of books. The
court held that even though the grounding of the boat was un-
avoidable, the defendants were bound to remove the books
before the water reached them. And in so holding, the court
put in an additional exception, stating that a carrier was not
liable "where the loss could not be guarded against by human
skill and prudence". However seven years later in the case
of Smyrl v. Niolon,53 where cotton was damaged when defend-
ant's boat ran afoul of a snag in the river, the court, in hold-
ing for the jury the question of whether or not the defendant
had knowledge of the snag, stated that the additional excep-
tion listed in Charleston & Columbia Steam Boat Co. ads.
Bason, supra, was improperly stated and that the exception
clearly came within the term "act of God". Thus the common
law rule was established as we know it today.
It is generally stated that in order to excuse the carrier for
a loss upon the ground that it was caused by an act of God,
such act must have been the proximate cause of the loss.5 4
That it has had some more or less remote part in producing
51. 2 Nott & McCord 88 (S. C. 1819).
52. Note 22, supra.
53. Note 35, supra.
54. Lewis v. Harvey, 101 Kan. 673, 168 P. 856 (1917).
9
et al.: RECENT CASES
Published by Scholar Commons, 1952
SOUTH CAROLINA LAW QUARTERLY
the accident is not sufficient, for if such was the law then al-
most any occurrence or loss might be attributed to an act of
God. However, it need not be the immediate cause but is suf-
ficient if the immediate cause or final act was set in motion
by an act of God and followed it in a natural and continuous
sequence, unbroken by any efficient intervening cause.55 But
even if the proximate cause of the loss results from an act of
God, if the negligence of the carrier mingle; with it as an ac-
tive and co-operative cause, the carrier is still responsible. Of
course, what is such contribution to the injury, or negligence, 6
or departure from duty by the carrier, as will deprive it from
the protection afforded by an act of God is not easy to ascer-
tain. A stricter rule is followed in courts of many jurisdictions,
for such courts hold that in order to excuse the carrier, the act
of God must not only be the proximate but also the sole cause
of the loss.57
Many interesting problems arise in both jurisdictions as to
what is the proximate or sole cause of the loss and whether
there is any negligence on the part of the carrier, and if so,
is the negligence the remote or concurring cause of the loss.
For example, a carrier's shipment is damaged due to an act of
God and there is no immediate negligence on the carrier's
part, however, the carrier is negligent in delaying the ship-
ment, without which delay the goods would not have been
damaged. Was the act of God the sole or proximate cause of
the loss? Was the negligence of antecedent delay by the car-
rier a concurring or a remote cause? There is definite con-
flict of authority concerning cases analogous to the above men-
tioned situation. In its final analysis the question resolves it-
self into one of proximate cause; i.e., whether the prior neg-
ligence, which made possible the loss, was a remote or a proxi-
mate or contributing cause thereof.
In some jurisdictions the rule is that, where goods in the
hands of a carrier are damaged by an act of God which the
carrier had no reason to anticipate, the carrier is not liable,
even though there was a previous delay in transportation due
to .the carrier's negligence, but for which the shipment would
not have been exposed to the destructive agency causing the
55. Blythe v. Denver & R. G. R. Co., 15 Colo. 333, 25 P. 702 (1891).
56. For various doctrines as to effect of negligence see 49 Am. Dec.
87; 64 Am. Dec. 394.
57. Sonneborn v. Southern R. Co., 65 S. C. 502, 44 S. E. 77 (1903);
see annotation, 46 A. L. R. 302.
10
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damage.58 This view has been adopted by the federal courts
and is followed by state courts in dealing with cases of inter-
state commerce.59 These cases are based on the reasoning that
the destruction of the goods by a supervening act of God is
not a result naturally to be anticipated from negligent delay
in transporting them.
Many other jurisdictions hold that if a shipment is negli-
gently delayed by the carrier, and as a result is damaged due
to an unanticipated act of God, the carrier is liable, its negli-
gence being deemed a cause concurring with the immediate
destructive agency in bringing about the damage.6 0 The Eng-
lish courts also follow this rule.61 The argument of this line
of cases was well stated in Green-Wheeler Shoe Co. v. Chicago
R. L & P. R. Co.,6 2 as follows:
Now, while it is true that defendant could not have an-
ticipated this particular flood, and could not have fore-
seen that its negligent delay in transportation would sub-
ject the goods to such a danger, yet it is now apparent
that such delay did subject the goods to the danger, and
that but for the danger they would have not been de-
stroyed; and that defendants should have foreseen as any
reasonable person could foresee, that the negligent de-
lay would extend the time during which the goods would
be liable in the hands of the carrier to be overtaken by
some such casualty, and would therefore increase the
peril that the goods should be thus lost to the shipper.
Although there is a split of authority on this question of
proximate cause, some text writers have stated the latter view
to be the sounder of the two. 63
The rules developed in connection with the liability of car-
riers of goods with reference to loss due to an act of God, or
of the public enemy, have no application to carriers of pas-
58. See annotation, 46 A. L. R. 302.
59. Julius Kessler & Co. v. Southern R. Co., 200 Ky. 713, 255 S. W.
535 (1923); Barnet v. New York C. & H. R. R. Co., 222 N. Y. 195, 118
N. E. 625 (1918), reversing 167 App. Div. 738, 153 N. Y. Supp. 374
(1915).
60. Slater v. South Carolina R. Co., 29 S. C. 96, 6 S. E. 936 (1888);
note 58, supra.
61. Trent v. Wood, 4 Dougl. K. B. 289, 99 Eng. Reprint 885 (1785).
62. 130 Iowa 123, 106 N. W. 498 (1906); cf. Ferguson v. Southern R.
Co., 91 S. C. 61, 74 S. E. 129 (1912); Sonneborn v. Southern R. Co., 65
S. C. 502, 44 S. E. 77 (1903).
63. 9 Am. Jur. 850.
11
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sengers, in as much as carriers of passengers are liable only
for negligence;64 and it matters not therefore whether the
injury is due to a natural cause of overwhelming force, or to
the wrongs or faults of third persons, unless the carrier is in
some way guilty of negligence with respect thereto. But if in
the exercise of the high degree of care and foresight required
of carriers of passengers the cause of the accident, whether
inevitable or not, could have been foreseen and the result
thereof avoided, the carrier will be liable.65 But the negligence
of the carrier must be the proximate and not remote cause
of the accident; although, if the immediate cause of the ac-
cident is an act of God the carrier will be liable if its negli-
gence concurs in any degree in causing the injury.66
CONCLUSION
In spite of the variety of definitions given to the term "act
of God", there is a comforting uniformity in the decisions re-
quiring the necessity of the elements of exclusion of human
agency and incapacity to foresee the said act of God. How-
ever, there is a definite split of authority among the jurisdic-
tions as to whether any negligence on the part of the person
sought to be charged will be considered as a remote or con-
curring cause of the loss. The decisions in each jurisdiction
should be consulted in order to determine their strictness in
this matter. An analysis of cases concerning acts of God re-
veal the importance of this subject. Its importance should not
be underestimated by attorneys for so long as there are forces
of nature there will be litigation concerning this subject.
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